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On the sensitivity of von Neum ann and Morgenstern abstract
stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
Joseph Greenberg~
ABSTRACT
The purpose oi this paper is twofold: First, to study the properties of
the notions of the "stable` and "individual stable" bargaining sets (SBS and
ISBS). Second, to point out the sensitivity of the von Neumann and
Morgenstern (vN8M) abstract stable set to the dominance relation that is
being employed: Insisting that each member of the coalition be made better
off yields the SBS, while requiring that at least one member of the
coalition is better off and all others are not worse off yields the ISBS.
Rather surprisingly, the SBS and the ISBS may have an empty intersection.
We fully characterize both the SBS and the ISBS in 3-person games
with transferable utilities, and we also show that in ordinally convex
games these two sets coincide with the core. As a by-product we thus
derive a new proof that such games have a nonempty core.
~ I wish to thank Dov Monderer and Benyamin Shitovitz for many
stimulating and enjoyable discussions, and an anonymous referee for several
useful comments. This revisíon of McGill University w orking paper 4I90
w as written during my enjoyable and fruitiul visit to CentER, Tilburg.
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On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract
stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
Joseph Greenberg
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to study the properties of
the notions of the 'stable' and 'individual stable' bargaining sets w hich are
ctosely related to Mas-Colell's (1989) except that it is required that not
only "objections', but also "counterobjections" be 'justified" or 'credible'.
Second, and perhaps more important, the paper points out the sensitivity of
the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNBM) abstract stable set to the
dominance relation that is being employed. More specifically, we shall
distinguish between the Tollowing two dominance relationships:
(i) A coalition may object to a proposed payoff only if each oi its
members can be made better off,
(ii) lt suffice that at least one member is better ofi while all others
are at least as well off for a coalition to object to a proposed
payoff.
Condition (i) gives rise to the stable bargaining set (SBS), while
condition (ii) yields the notion of the individual stable bargaining set
(ISBS). And, rather surprisingly, it will be shown that these two dominance
relations might yield two very different vN8 M abstract stable sets. In
particular, the SBS and the ISBS may have an empty intersection, even in
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games with transferable utilities. In fact, such is always the case in 3-
person ga mes that have an empty core.
We fully characterize both the SBS and the 1SBS in 3-person
superadditive games with transferable utilities. It turns out that, in such
games, both sets contain only Pareto optim al payoffs. In ordinally convex
games, both the SBS and the 1SBS coincide with the core. Since for the
general n-person superadditive game both sets are nonempty, (Greenberg
1990, Theorem 6.5.6), we get, as a by-product, a new proof that ordinally
convex games have a nonempty core. (See Vilkov 1977, and Greenberg 1985.)
The set of Pareto optim al payoffs in the ISBS coincides with the
'consistent bargaining set`, a solution concept that was recently suggested
by B. Dutta, 0. Ray, K. Sengupta, and R. Vohra (1989). They show, however,
that the consistent bargaining set might be empty (for 4-person ga mes with
transferable utilities. See section 6.) In contrast, the SBS in their example
does contain Pareto optimal payoffs. Whether this is atways the case in
superadditive games with transferable utilities, remains an open question.
The notions of the SBS and the ISBS were first suggested within the
framework of the theory of social situations (Greenberg 1990). But, this
paper will be cast completely within classical game theory, making use of
the concept of vN8M abstract stable set. This notion w as introduced by
vNBM in a few pages at the end of the second edition (in 1947) of their
classical book. They of fered it purely as a mathematical extension of `the
vN8M solution`; they neither motivated it, nor suggested an application ot
it. In contrast, the theory of social situations stemmed from the basíc
question of "rational choice`. Shitovitz (Greenberg 1990, Theorem 4.5)
observed that one of the concepts in this theory (specifically, an
"optimistic stable standard of behavior") can formally be associated with a
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vNBM abstract stable set. Using this result, some of the better known game-
theoretic solution concepts~, as well as interesting new solution concepts2,
were derived from the unique vNBM abstract stable sets that correspond to
different negotiation processes (Greenberg 1990).
Following the associate editor's suggestion, the reader is referred to
Greenberg (1990) for the motivation behind the abstract systems that define
the SBS and the ISBS, as well as for definitions of well-known game-
theoretic concepts.
~ Such as: The core and the vNBM solution in cooperative games, coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium in normal form games and the set of subgame perfect
equilibria in extensive form games.
2 5uch as: Refinements of subgame perfect equilibria, equilibria when either
contingent threats or irrevocable commitments can be made by either an
individual or a group oi individuals.
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2 The stable and individual stable bargaining sets
This section provides the form al definitions of the stable and the
individual stable bargaining sets, and studies some of their properties.
Let N be a finite none m pty set, and let R be the set of all real
numbers. A coalition is a nonemptu subset of N. For a coalition SCN, RS
denotes the S-dimensional Euclidean space. If xeRN and S is a coalition,
then xS denotes the restriction of x on S. Let S be a coalition and let
xS,ySeRS. Then, xS?yS if x~?yi for all ieS ; xS~yS if xS?yS but xS:yS ; and
xS~~yS if x~~yi ior all ieS. Recall the following definition:
Definition 21: An n-person qame in characteristic Iunction
Iorm (henceforth a qame~ is a pair (N,v), where N is the nonempty finite
set of players and v is the characteristic function w hich assigns to every
coalition SCN, a nonempty and compact subset of RS„ denoted v(S).
A game (N,v) is called a Ouasi transferable utility (OTU) game, if
it satisfies the following ('nonlevelness") property:
For all SCN and x,yev(S), if x~y then there exists zev(S) such that x~~z.
A game (N,v) is called a transferable utilíties ( TU) game, and is
denoted by (N,y). if for all SCN there exists a nonnegative scalar, ~(S),
such that v(S) is given by: v(S)-{xeR~S I iiEgx~sy(S)l.
In this paper we shall be concerned only with QTU games. For a OTU
game (N,v), let v"(S) denote the set of all S-Pareto optimal payoffs in v(S),
that is,
v'(S)-{xev(S)Ithere is no yev(S) such that yt~xt for all ieSF.
(The compactness of v(S), see Definition 2.1, implies that v"(S) is compact
and nonempty.)
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Evidently, there are many negotiation processes that can be employed
by players in a characteristic function form game, (N,v). Thus, m any abstract
systems, describing these negotiation processes, can be associated with
(N,v). (See Greenberg 1990, Chapter 6, for negotiation processes that lead to
the core and the vN8M solution.) This paper is concerned with the procedure
w here each ptayer updates his reservation price according to the last offer
that was made to him.3 More specifically, assume that a payoff x is offered.
Coalition S can object to x if there is an S-Pareto optimal payoff ysev(S)
which makes each member strictly better off, that is, yS~~xS. Members of
N`S continue to believe in xN~S. The new modified offer then becomes
y-(yS,xN`S). Now, another coalition, T, may object to y, again, on the basis
that there ~s a T-Pareto optimal payoff zTev(T) such that each member of T
is strictly better off under zT than he is under y, that is, zT ~~yT. The
resulting new modified offer is then z-(zT,yN`T), and the bargaining process
continues in the same manner. Observe that the bargaining procedure
described here is such that modified offers need no longer be feasible, i.e.,
need not belong to v(N).
The above procedure can be described by the following abstract
system4 (D,L), where D~RN. , and for x,yeD,
x~y c~ 3 SCN, ySev'(S), yS~~xS, and yN`S,xN`S,
3 This procedure is reminiscent of the housing market, where every seller
evaluates his house according to the last offer he had, even though it is
possible that one potential buyer made several oifers to different sellers,
so that it is impossible for all sellers to get their reservation price.
4 For definitions and notation of well-know n game-theoretic notions, as
well as for motivation, see Greenberg 1990, Chapters 4 and 6.
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The definition of the dominance relation L is traditional: It is
customary to require that a coalition will object to a proposed payoff only
if all. of its members are made better off, since changing the 'status quo' is
costly, and individuals have to be compensated for doing so. lt is,
nevertheless, interesting to study the consequences of modifying this
requirement, and allow coalitions to object to a proposed payoff whenever
at least one member is better off whíle all others are not worse off. Define,
therefore, the second abstract system (D,L~) as follows: DáRN, and
for x,yeD,
xL~y c~ 3 SCN, ySEV"(S), yS~xS, and yN`S-xN`S.
Theorem 2.2- Both (D,L) and (D,L') admit a unique vNBM abstract stable
sets, A and A", respectively.
Prooi: Greenberg 1990, Theorem 6.5.7.
The [individual] stable bargaining set is defined as the set of all
feasible payoifs x, i.e., all payoffs xev(N), which belong to the unique vNBM
abstract stable set for (D,L) [(D,L")). That is,
Definition -2.3: Let (N,v) be a OTU game. The stabfe ba~Qainin set
LSB~ of (N,v) is the set SBS(N,v)-Anv(N), and the individual stable
baryaining---set -jISBS of (N,v) is the set ISBS(N,v)-A"nv(N).S
S For the relation of the SBS and the ISBS to the concepts of the bargaining
sets (Aumann and Maschler (1964), and modified by Mas-Colell (1969)), see
Greenberg (1990, Section 6.5).
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Thearem 2.4: Both the SBS and the ISBS are nonempty for all
superadditiveb games. Moreover, each of these two sets contains the core~
of the game.
Proof: Greenberg 1990, Theorems 6.5.4 and 6.5.6.
Rather surprisingly, the seemingly minor modification in the
definitions of the dominance relations might yield totally distinct solution
concepts; the 1SBS and the SBS may have an empty intersection, even for TU
games! In particular, perhaps counter-intuitively, Example 3.10 shows that
the SBS does not, in general, inctude the tSBS. However, Section 4
establishes that in ordinally convex games, the ISBS coincides with the
SBS.
Remark --2-5: The proof of Theorem 2.2 (which enabled the definitions of
the SBS and the lSBS) makes use of von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947, p.
597-600) result, assertrny that rf the dominance relation rs strictly acyclic
then there exists a unique abstract stable set. (t is because of this that I
require a coalition S to dominate by using S-Pareto optimal payoffs, while
payoffs in SBS and ISBS were not required to belong to v"(N). An
interesting question is whether A and A", respectively, remain (the
unique?) vN8M abstract stable sets for the (possibly more appealing)
systems (D,~L) and (D,LLfi), where D-RNt, and for x,yeD,
6 That is, (N,u) is such that for all S,TCN, SnT-ra, we have that xsev(S) and
yTev(T) imply zev(SUT), where zr-xr if ieS, and zr-yr if ieT.
7 Note that the core of a QTU game is the same for both dominance
relations L and ~~. Indeed, in OTU games, it is possible to make one player
better off (all others as well off) if and only ii it is possible to make all
players better oif.
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xLLy a 3 SCN, ySev(S), yS~~xS, and yN`S-xN`S.
x. ..y ~~ 3 SCN, ySev(S), ys~xs, and yN`S-xN`S.
Remark 2.6: In a recent paper, Dutta et al. (1969) offered a new solution
concept - the consistent bargaining set, CB(N,v). These four scholars
were motivated neither by the theory of social situations nor by vN8M
abstract stable sets, but rather, they wanted to amend the deficiency in the
definition of Mas-Colell"s bargaining set by treating "objections" and
"counterobjections" symmetrically. Ron Holtzman (private communication)
observed that, as is easily verified, it turns out that their (recursive)
definition is equivalent to: CB(N,v)-ISBSnv~(N). That is, CB(N,v) is the
set of Pareto optim al payoffs that belong to the individual stable
bargaining set. Thus, as a by-product, we get a new characterization of the
consistent bargaining set, based on vNBM abstract stable set. 0 ne of the
advantages of this characterization is that it enables to extend this notion
to ga mes wtth an infinite number of players. (Recall that the original
definition oi the CB is recursive.) Thts is particularly appealing since it is
market games with an atomless space of agents that initiated Mas-Colell's
(1989) modified bargaining set. Of course, one has, then, to address the
issues of existence and uniqueness of A and A" for such games.
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3 Three players TU games
Consider the 0-normalized TU game, (N,y), where N-{1,2,3i and lor all
ieN, y(i)-0. (Recall that y(S)?0 for alt S; see Definition 2.1 J Oenote:
S~a{1,21, S2s{2,3i, Saa{1,31,
and for all xeRN, and SCN,
x(S)áElEgxl, and e(S,x)~}1(S)-x(S).
The function e(.,.) is known as the excess lunction.
The two main results of this section fully characterize the SBS and
the ISBS in 0-normalized TU three person games. Both sets contain only
Pareto optim al payofis and they both contain all of the core payoffs. But,
for a non-core payoff to belong to the SBS it is necessary and sufficient
that it be blocked by exactly two 2-players coalitions, while for a non-core
payoff to belong to the ISBS it is necessary and sufficient that it be
blocked by all three 2-players coalitions, and moreover, the excess of each
of these coalitions is less than the sum of the excesses of the other two. It
follows that il the core is empty, then the SBS and the ISBS are totally
distinct sets. Form ally,
Theorem 3.1: Let (N,u) be a 0-normalized TU three person game. Then,
xESBS(N,u) if and only if, x is Pareto optimal, i.e., x(N)-y(N), and either
xeCore(N,y), or else, there exist j,ke{1,2,3} such that e(Sj,x)-e(Sk,x)~0 and
e(St,x)s0 for {t}-{1,2,3}`{j,k}.
Theorem 3.2: Let (N,u) be a 0-normalized TU three person game. Then,
xeISBS(N,y~) if and only if, x is Pareto optimal, i.e., x(N)-y(N), and either
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xeCore(N,y), or else, e(Sj,x)~0 for j-1,2,3, and moreover,
e(Sj,x)~e(Sk,x).e(St,x), for any choice of j,k,t, {j,k,tf-{1,2,3i.
In order to establish Theorem 3.1 we lirst need the fotlowing three
Lemmas.
Lemma 3.3: Let yeRN, be such that y(N)?u(N), and there exists a choice
of j,k,t, {j,k,t{-{1,2,3E. that satisfies: e(Sj,y)-e(Sk,y), and e(St,y)50. Then,
yEA.
Proof: Otherwise, there exists zeA such that yLZ. Since e(St,y)50, e(N,y)S0,
and the game is 0-normalized, it follows that e(Sj,y)-e(Sk,y)~0. W.l.o.g.,
assume that z blocks y using Sj, i.e., z(Sj)-u(Sj). Then, e(S,z)50 for all
S:Sk, and e(Sk,z)~0. Hence, there exists w such that zLw using Sk, and
w(S)?}~(S) for all SCN. Therefore, weA, which, together with the stability of
A, contradicts zeA.
O.E.D.
Lemma 3.4- If xeA then there exists at least one coalition S, I S I-2, such
that x(S)~~(S).
Proof: - Otherwise, e(S,x)~0 for all I S I-2. Assume, w.l.o.g., that
e(S~,x)?e(S2,x)?e(S~,x)~0. For a, Osocse(S~,x), denote
ya-(x~.a,x2.[e(S~,x)-al.x3).






Since g is continuous in a, there exists ~, O~~~e(S~,x), such that g(~)-0.
Define y-ys. Then, x[y (using coalition {1,21). Since A is stable, y~A. By
Lemma 3.3, (recall that e(S2,y)-e(S3,y), and that for all oc, e(S,y~)-0], we
have that y(N)~y~(N).
Define y-(yi.yp,x3.[~(N)-y(N)]). Then, x~ y(using N). Since A is stable,
y~A. But, by Lemma 3.3, yeA (since y(N)-y~(N), e(S2,y)-e(Sy,y), and e(S~,y~~0).
Contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.5: If xeSBS then xev"(N), i.e., x(N)-y(N).
Proof: Otherwise, xeSBS`v"(N). Assume, w.l.o.g., that
e(Si,x)?e(SZ,x)~e(Sy,x). By Lemma 3.4, e(Sy,x)s0. Hence, every coalition that
blocks x contains player 2. Denote:
M-Max{e(S,x) I SCNi, Ba{S I e(S,x)-M}, and S-[y(N)-x(N)]I3.
Then, M~S~O. Distinguish among the following three cases:
1. {S~,S2EC B: Define y, where yi-xi.S, i-1,2,3. Clearly, x~y (using N) and
hence, xeA implies y~A. But, e(S~,x)-e(Sy,x)-M implies e(S~,y)-e(Sp,y), and
therefore, (recall that e(S~,x)50), by Lemma 3.3, yeA. Contradiction.
2. S~aB: Then, SaB for all I SI -2. Thus, 8-{N{. Recall that e(S3,x)50. Thus,
player 2 belongs to all the blocking coalitions. It follows, that there exists
a payof f y. (with y2~xp.Max(e(S~,x),OI), such that y~~x, y(N)-y(N), and
y(S)?y~(S) for all SCN. Thus, yeA. But then, xLy contradicts xeA.
3. S~eB and Szv B: Then, there exists y that satisfies: y~~x~, yy~xy, y~-x~,
y(1,2)-u(1,2), and y(2,3)?}~(2,3). Since y(N)-x(N).M?}1(N), we have that yeA,
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contradicting xLy and xeA.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Lemma 3.3 yields the "if' part oi the theorem. To
prove the "only if' part, it suffices, in view of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5., to
show that if x is Pareto optim at and satisfies: e(Sj,x)~e(Sk,x)~0 and
e(St,x)s0 for {tf-(1,2,3(`{j,k), then xéSBS(N,y). Indeed, since SjnSk:ra, there
exists zev"(Sj) such that z~~xi for ieSj, e(Sj,z)-0~e(Sk,z). Thus, e(S,z)50
for all S, implying that zeA. Since x[ z, we conclude that xa A, hence
xé SBS(N,}~).
O.E.D.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.2. In order to establish this
theorem, we first need the following three Lemmas.
Lemma-3.6: II xeA' and x can be blocked, then x(S)~y(S) for all I S I-2.
Proof: Otherwise, there exists SCN, I S I-2 such that e(S,x)50. Assume,
w.l.o.g., that e(S~,x)?e(S2,x)?e(S~,x). Then, e(S~,x)50, implying that player 2
belongs to all the blocking coalitions. Define z, where z~-x~, z~-x3, and
z2-xp.Max{(e(S,x)). Since x can be blocked, zp~xz. Thus, xLwz. But z cannot
be blocked, hence zeA", contradicting x~~z and xeA".
O.E.D.
Lemma 3.7: If xeISBS then e(Sj,x)~e(Sk,x).e(St,x), for any choice of j,k,t,
{j,k,t)-(1,2,3).
Proof: Otherwise, w.l.o.g., e(S~,x)?e(Sq,x).e(S~,x). Then, there exist y~ and
y2 that satisfy: y~?x~.e(5~,x), yp?xp.e(S2,x), and y~.y2-y(1,2). Let z be equal
to y-(y~,yy,x3) if y(N)?y(N), and if y(N)~y(N) let z be such that z~~y, and
z(N)-y(N). Then, z(S)?}~(S) for all S, implying zeA". But x~.z, (using either N
or {1,2f). contradicting xeA'.
O.E.D.
Lemma 3.9: If xe1SBS then x is Pareto optimal, i.e., x(N)-y(N).
Alternatively, ISBS(N,y) coincides with the consistent bargaining set,
CB(N,y).





By Lemma 3.7, y~~x. Now, if y(N)5}~(N), then there exists z?y with z(N)-y(N).
It follows that z(S)?y~(S) for all S, implying that zeA". But xL~z. (using N),
contradicts xeA".
Thus, y(N)~y(N). Since x(N)~y~(N), there exists z such that z(N)-y(N),
z~~x and z~~y. Since x[~z (using N), zeA". That is, there exists weA" with
zL~w. Since z(N)-}~(N), w is supported by, w.t.o.g., S~:{1,2f. That is,
w-(wi.wZ,zs), wi?zi. wz?z2. and w(Si)-}~(S~). Therefore, by Claim 3.6, w
cannot be blocked. In particular, w(S~)-w~.z3?~(1,3) and w(SZ)-w2.za?y(2,3).
Hence, wi.wp.2z~-y(1,2).2z3?y(1,3).}~(2,3), implying that
za~('Iy)(}~(1,3).y(2,3)-}t(1,2))-X~.oty.yy. BUt z~~y. Contradiction.
O.E.D.
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Proof of Theore m 3.2: Let (N,y) be a 0-normalized TU three person ga me.
In view of Lemmas 3.6-3.6, it suffices to show that if xev"(N)`Core(N,}~) is
such that e(S,x)~0 for all I S I-2, and moreover, e(Sj,x)~e(Sk,x).e(St,x), 1or any
choice of j,k,t, {j,k,t}-{1,2,3[. then xe1SBS(N,}~). lndeed, otherwise, there
exists zeA" such that xt~z. Since xev"(N), we have that z(Sj)-y(Sj), for
some je{ 1,2,3}. By Lemma 3.6, therefore, e(S,z)50 for all I S I-2. But
e(Sj,x)~e(Sk,x).e(St,x) implies that there exists k, such that e(Sk,z)~0.
Contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 yield the following surprising result.
CorollarU 3.9: Let (N,}~) be a 0-normalized 3-person TU game. Then,
AnA":{xeD I x is not blocked}. It follows that SBSnI58S-Core(N,y). In
particular, if the core is empty, then SBSnlSBS-ra.
Proof: Since (N,}~) is a TU game, ~(D)-~"(~)-8 By the (external) stability
of A, AD[D`r,(D)]. Similarly, by the (external) stability of A",
A"~[D`~"(D)]. Hence, AnA"D(D`~(D)]-[D`~"(D)l.
To show that the reverse inclusion also holds, consider
xe~(D)[-~"(D)l. By Lemma 3.6, if xEA" then x(S)~y(S) for every coalition S
that consists ot two players. By Lemma 3.4, therefore, x~A.
Q.E.D.
8 For a set BCD, ~(B) is the set oi elements in D that are dominated by B,
i.e., ~(B)-{xeD I there exists yeB, xty{.
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I end this section by studying two examples that demonstrate some of
the possible relationships among the three notions: The core, the SBS, and
the ISBS. In both examples, ! personally find the SBS to be more appealing
than the ISBS.9
ExamDle 3.10: The three person majority game: There are three players.
Every coalition that has a(simple) majority, that is, every coalition
consisting of two or more players, can distribute among its members 2
dollars. The utilities of the three players are linear with money. The TU
game that describes this social environment is given by (N,}~), where
N-{1,2,3}, }1(S)-2 ii IS~?2, and for ieN, y({i})-0.
As is well-known, Care(N,}i)-~. Using Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, it is easy to
see that
SBS(N,yl)-{(1 ,1 ,0),(1 ,0,1),(0,1,1)},
and
ISBS(N,y~)-{x I x(N)-y~(N)-2, and xi~l for all iENI.
Thus, the core of this game is empty while the individual stable bargaining
set, w hich coincides with the consistent bargaining set, is given by the
shaded area in Figure l. In contrast, the stable bargaining set consists of
the three outcomes (the three heavy dotted points in Figure 1) that stem
from two players forming a coalition, and distributing the 2 dollars evenly
between them.
9 Recall that the ISBS is closety related to, and by Lem ma 3.8, in 3-person
games coincides with the consistent bargaining set, CB(N,u).
1G
Example 3.10 should not leave the impression that in general the SBS
"is a smaller set" than the ISBS. Indeed, in the following example the SBS
strictly includes the ISBS (implying, by Corollary 3.9 that the ISBS
coincides with the core).
ExamDle 3.11: Consider the game (N,}~), where }~(1,2)-y(1,3)-y(N)-100, and
y(S)-~ otherwise. Then,
Core-ISBS-{(100,0,0)} and SBS-{(100-2a,ot,ot) I OSo~50E.
It is obvious that Core-{(100,0,0)}. The following observations verify
the other assertions.
(i) ISBS-{(100,0,0)}: Consider x-(oc,~.ó)ev(N) with a~100. Assume, w.l.o.g.,
that ~?ó. Then, (100-ó)~a, implying that y-(100-ó:~,?f) cannot be dominated.
Hence y belongs to A". Since xL~y, it follows that xe ISBS. Since
Core-{(100,0,0)}, Theorem 2.4 yields that Core-ISBS-{(100,0,0)}.
(ii) SBS-{(100-2o~,a,oc)IO5oc5S0}: Observe, first, that x-(a,~,ó)eA whenever
~~ó. Indeed, define, 6-(~.ó)~2, and y-(100-5,{3,S)eA. Then, y cannot be
dominated. Hence y belongs to A. Since xLy, xeA. It follows that x-(100-
2o~,a,a)eA, since otherwise, there exists zeA such that xLZ. But then
z-(a,{3,71), with ~~ó, and we just saw that such z cannot belong to A.
As in the previous example, 1 find the SBS for this game more
appealing than the ISBS, despite the fact that the SBS is larger. It seems to
me that players 2 and 3 are not totally 'helpless" vis a vis player 1; they
could, for example, collude.
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4 Ordinally Convex games10
There are, of course, games in which the SBS and the ISBS do
intersect; in fact, there are games in which the two sets coincide. One
class of such games is the set oi "convex games", where
Definition--4.1- A game (N.v) is called
1. (ordinally) convex if it satisfies: For any xeRN and any two
coaliUons S and T, if xsev(S) and xTev(T), then either xSUTEV(SUT) or
xSnTEV(SnT).
2. comp~ehensiye if for all SCN, xev(S) implies yev(S) for all Osysx.
ln particular, Oev(S).
The main result of this section is
Theorem 4.2: Let (N,v) be a comprehensive, OTU convex game. Then,
A-A"-{xeR,Nlx cannot be blockedl.
In particular,
SBS(N,v)-ISBS(N,v)-Core(N,v).
In order to prove this theorem, we first need to establish the
following Lemma.
Lemma 4.3: Let ( N,v) be a comprehensive, OTU and convex game. Then,
F-D`0(D)-{xeRNlx cannot be blockedl
is a vNBM abstract stable set for (D,~).
10 This section makes extensive use of the results in Section 3.3 in Dutta
et al. (1989).
18
Proof: Clearly, ~(F)CD`F. To conclude the proof we need to show that
D`FC~(F). The proof of this inclusion generalizes, but closely follows that
of Proposition 3.3 in Dutta et. al. Otherwise, there exists xeD`F but xe(,(F),
Thus, there exists S that blocks x through some y, and (yS,xN~S)eF. By the
comprehensiveness of (N,v), therefore, the set O~z~, where
0~-{(S,y) ~ ySEV"(S). yN`S-xN`S and yS~~xsl.
By considering minimal (in the set inclusion ordering) coalitions in Q~, it
is easy to see that there exists (S`,y~eQ~ such that no subset of S can block
y, and S is a maximal such coalition. Since (yS,xN~S)e F, the
comprehensiveness of (N,v) implies that set Qpz~, where
02-1(T,z) I zTev(T), zN`(T`S]-y~N`(T`5), and zT`S~~yT`SE.
By the choice of S, (T,z)eQ2 implies T`Szra. Let
(T,z7EArgMax{(T,z)e02}Min{ieT`SEz~~
Since (yS,xN~S)é F, Min{ieT`Sf z~~0.
Then, y5-z5ev(S) and z~ev(T). By the choice of S,
z'S"nT-ySnT~lnt.v(SnT). By Lemma 3.3 in Dutta et al. (1989), it follows that
z~SuTEV(SuT). Now, if there was a coalition WCSuT that blocks z, using
t,iev(W), then, by the choice of S, W`Sz~. Moreover, c,iW~S~~z~~~ implies
that MiniEtil`Sc.~i~MiniET`Sz~. Since ~SnT,ySnT and (N,v) is
comprehensive, the above strict inequality contradicts the choice of z. Thus,
z is not blocked by any subset of SuT.
But this contradicts the maximality of S. (Recall that T`Szg,
implying I SuT I~ I S I.)
O.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: By Lemma 4.3 we have that the unique vNBM
abstract stable set for (D,~) is: A-{xeR,Nl x cannot be blocked}, Using
Theorem 2.2, in order to conclude the proof of the theorem, it suffices to
show that A is a vNBM abstract stable set for (D,L~).
Indeed, since (N,v) is QTU, Anp(A)-~ implies that AnpM(A)-rd, that
is, 0"(A)CD`A. To see that the reverse inclusion also holds, consider
xeD`A. Cty Lemma 4.3, there exists yeA such that x.~y, implying xi~y. Hence,
0"(A)~D`A. Thus, ~"(A)-D`A, i.e., A is a vNBM abstract stable set for
(D.~~).
Q.E.D.
A by-product of Theorem 4.2 provides a new proof for the
nonemptiness of the core of convex games (see Vilkov 1977, and Greenberg
1985).
Corollafy- 4.4: The core of a comprehensive, QTU, and convex game is
nonempty.
Proof- Let (N,v) be a comprehensive, QTU, and convex game. Then, since
Oev(Q) for all OCN, the convexity oi (N,v) yields that for all xsev(S),
(xS,ON~S)EV(N). By Theorem 2.4, therefore, SBS(N,v)zr~. Theorem 4.2
concludes the prooi.
O.E.D.
lt is noteworthy that Peleg (1986) proved that in convex games the
core ~s also the unique vNBM solution.
zo
5 An open question
By Theorem 2.4, both the SBS and the ISBS are nonempty in all
superadditive QTU games. An interesting question is w hether, in such
games, these sets contain only, or at least some, Pareto optimal payoffs.
Dutta et al. showed that it is possible that ISBSnv"(N)-ró.
Specifically, they consider the 4 player TU game (N,u), where N-{1,2,3,4E,
y(1,2,3)-}~(2,3,4)-66, y(1,4)-46, }~(1,2,4)-}~(1,3,4)-63, }~(N)-80, and y~(S)-0
otherwise. They show (Dutta et al. 1989, Proposition 4.1) that
CB(N,u)-1SBSnv"(N)-r~.
In contrast, the SBS in this ga m e does contain Pareto optimal payoffs.
For example, x"-(23,17,17,23)eSBS. Indeed, {l,q}, {1,3,4} and {1,2,4} cannot
block x". It remains to check for coalitions i1,2,3f and {2,3,4}. Now,if
{1,2,3} blocks x" with y, then y~~x"~, implying that [y2.yyl~[66-23]. But
then, there exists a payoff z such that z(2,3,4)-}~(2,3,4)-66 and y~z. Since
z(S)?y~(S) for all S, zeA. The stability of A implies, therefore, that yeA. An
analogous argument shows that {2,3,41 cannot block x' using a payoff in A.
Thus, x"eA.
It remains an open question whether in superadditive TU games we
have that SBSCV"(N), or, at least, SBSnv"(N)x~. An affirmative answer to
this question will be particularly pleasing, since if the "real world` is to
provide a guideline, then the notion of the SBS seems to be more
appropriate than the ISBS (or the CB); individuals often insist on some
compensation if the "status quo" is to be changed.
zl
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